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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)U), as the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the
Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
~

Appellees are not required to include a statement of the issues unless they are
"dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant." See Utah R. App. P. 24(b )( 1).
Beckman's statement of the issues, with corresponding standards of review, is largely
acceptable, with two exceptions.
First, regarding Beckman's "First Issue," although jury instructions are, as
Beckman notes, reviewed for correctness, even if a jury instruction is erroneous, the
Court will not reverse the verdict if the error is harmless. See, e.g., Butler v. Naylor,
1999 UT 85, 121, 987 P.2d 41.
Second, regarding Beckman' s "'Fifth Issue," Appellees add that "[ e]ven when the
trial court has erred in its evidentiary decision, 'reversal is appropriate only in those cases
where, after review of all the evidence presented at trial, it appears that absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached." See

Lawrence v. MountainStar Healthcare, 2014 UT App 40, 1 16, 320 P .3d 103 7 (quoting
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, il 8,977 P.2d 508).

1
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1. Interest rates-Contracted rate-Legal rate

( 1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon ay rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest,
the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. Attorney fees-Reciprocal rights to recover attorney
fees

A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party
to recover attorney fees.

2
~
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature, Course, and Disposition of Proceedings 1
On November 2, 2011, Beckman, then-CEO of Cybertary, sued Cybertary
claiming wrongful termination and seeking damages for unpaid wages and benefits. (R.

1.) Beckman's claims arise out of an employment agreement (the "Employment
Agreement") that she signed with Cybertary. (R. 1.) The Employment Agreement sets
forth grounds for Beckman's termination for "cause" and Beckman's salary and benefits.
(R. 15.) On November 21, 2011, Beckman amended her complaint (the "Amended
Complaint") to sue Franchise Foundry and Faulconer2 for breach of the Employment
Agreement. (R. 11.) In addition, Beckman sought a declaratory judgment establishing
that her termination was wrongful and that Franchise Foundry and F au Icon er acted in bad
faith (R. 11-12.)
A year and a half later, Beckman moved to amend her complaint, again, to add a

1

Beckman's "Background" section of her statement of the case deviates from a recitation
of the case's procedural history and is completely unsupported by any citation to the
appellate record. Even more troublingly, its unsupported statements are irrelevant and
false-statements like "Ms. Beckman had the misfortune ... ," "Franchise Foundry did
next to nothing" or "virtually nothing," and Beckman was driven "nearly to destitution."
See Appellant's Br. at 5, 6. This violates Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(7),
which requires that "[a]ll statements of fact ... shall be supported by citations to the
record." Elsewhere in her brief, Beckman refers to Franchise Foundry's performance as
"criminally ineffective." See Appellant's Br. at 42. To be clear, this case does not have,
and never has had, a criminal component. Beckman' s unsupported, hyperbolic
statements verge upon "burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters." See
Utah R. App. P. 24(k).
2

Cybertary, Franchise Foundry, and Faulconer are referred to herein as "Appellees."
3
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number of additional claims and allegations against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry.
(R. 168-69.) The district court denied the motion for leave to amend as untimely. (R.

351-52.) The district court also found that the amendment would prejudice Appellees if
Beckman were permitted to file it. (R. 351.)
Thereafter, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. (R. 455-56.) The
district court denied the parties' cross-motions, except as to Beckman' s contract claims
against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry, which the district court dismissed. (R. 897-

98.) The parties proceeded to trial on their remaining claims in October 7-10, 2014. (R.
1457-62.) Following trial, the jury found that Cybertary breached the Employment
Agreement by failing to pay Beckman certain compensation and benefits despite the fact
that Beckman was Cybertary's sole officer and, therefore, ostensibly in charge of
ensuring her payment. (R. 1501.) The jury also found "cause" for Cybertary's
termination of Beckman and that Faulconer and Franchise Foundry did not act with gross
negligence or willful misconduct toward Beckman. (R. 1501.) The district court later
granted Beckman's request for attorney's fees against Cybertary (R. 1830) as well as
Appellees' respective requests for attorney's fees against Beckman arising out of their
successful defense ofBeckman's contract claims against them (R. 1820-31). The district
court denied Beckman's request for prejudgment interest on her award against Cybertary
(R. 1818-23) and entered final judgment (R. 1831-32).

4
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Statement of Facts
The Parties and the Operating Agreement
Franchise Foundry is in the business of investing in, partnering with, and
providing assistance to business entities seeking to expand franchising opportunities. (R.
636.) In 20 I 0, Franchise Foundry began a business relationship with Beckman and her
company. Beckman and Appellees reorganized Beckman's company, which became
Cybertary. (R. 636.) On or about June 1, 2010, Beckman and Cybertary entered into the
Employment Agreement. (R. 636.) No other person or entity was party to the
Employment Agreement. (R. 635.)
Cybertary's operating agreement (the "Operating Agreement") was executed on or
about July 6, 2010, by Beckman, Franchise Foundry, and an entity called Franchise
Foundry Holdings ULC (''FFH"). (R. 636.) The Operating Agreement provided that
each member could appoint a manager to Cybertary's board of managers. Beckman
appointed herself. (R. 636.) Franchise Foundry appointed Faulconer (who was not a
party to the Operating Agreement). (R. 636.) FFH appointed K. Todd Hicks ("Hicks").
(R. 636.) A "Services Agreement" between Cybertary and Franchise Foundry set forth
the scope of services that Franchise Foundry would perform for Cybertary. (R. 558-64,
627.) These included certain marketing and sales services. (R. 563-64.)
The Employment Agreement set forth Beckman's compensation, pay schedule,
and benefits (R. 599-600.) The Employment Agreement provided that Cybertary could
terminate Beckman's employment for "cause." (R. 599.) Cause justifying Beckman's

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

immediate termination was defined as:
(I) "Executive's [Beckman's] commission of a felony of any kind or
any other crime (whether it is a felony or not) involving securities fraud,
theft, or moral turpitude";
(Il)"Executive's willful breach, habitual neglect, gross neglect, or
dereliction of Executive's duties under this Agreement";
"Executive's material misconduct with regard to the
(Ill)
Company, including, but not limited to, Executive's failure to comply with
Company's written rules and policies";
"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise,
(IV)
that discredits the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the
Company or the Company's results of operations or business";
(V)
"Any act by Executive of sexual harassment ( or Executive's
creating a hostile work environment) or any other activity of Executive
prohibited by state, local, and/or federal law with respect to discrimination
based on age, sex, race, religion, or national origin";
"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise,
(VI)
that discredits the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the
Company or the Company's results of operations or business;" and/or
(VII)
Any breach of any Executive's obligation under the
Inventions, Confidentiality, and Restrictive Covenant Agreement referred
to below.
(R. 598-99.) Beckman served as Cybertary's CEO from the effective date of the
Employment Agreement until Cybertary terminated her employment in November 2011.
During that time, Beckman was Cybertary's sole officer. (R. 635.)
~

The Dispute Between Beckman and Appellees, and Settlement Discussions
On or about May 20, 2011, Beckman declared personal bankruptcy. (R. 629,
1195.) Beckman did not inform Faulconer or Franchise Foundry of the bankruptcy. (R.
629.) Beckman's failure to disclose her personal bankruptcy was a significant problem
because bankruptcies of officers constitute material changes that must be disclosed to
state regulatory agencies for approval, as well as every potential franchisee that is
6
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considering the franchise opportunity. (R. 629.) Failure to disclose would place
Cybertary in a particularly dangerous position, as franchises it issued while it was
unapproved would be subject to rescission. (R. 629.)
On or about October 11, 2011, Beckman ( and her then-counsel) sent written
communications to Appellees regarding the parties' various disputes under the
Employment Agreement, Operating Agreement, and Service Agreement. Those
communications included, without limitation, an email from Beckman to Appellees and
others date/time stamped October 11, 2011, 2:40 p.m. (the "October 11 Email"). (R.
1203.) The October 11 Email accuses Franchise Foundry of numerous breaches of the
Services Agreement. 3 (R. 1203.) Those communications also included a letter from
Greggory J. Savage (Beckman's then-counsel) to Faulconer, dated October 11, 2011 (the
"October 11 Letter"). The October 11 Letter stated that Mr. Savage was retained by
Beckman "to represent her with her dealings with Franchise Foundry, LLC and Franchise
Foundry Holders ULC." (R. 1196.) The October 11 Letter claimed that Cybertary owed
unpaid wages and benefits to Beckman and demanded payment of a specified amount.
(R. 1196.) The October 11 Letter stated that "[i]f the demanded payment is not made
within ten ( 10) days from the date of this letter, we have been instructed to commence
litigation seeking the foregoing amount, plus interest and attorney's fees and costs." (R.
1195.)

3

Later, in an email to Cybertary franchisees, Beckman pointed to the October 11 Email
and stated that it notified Faulconer that Beckman "had cause for a lawsuit against
Franchise Foundry for multiple breaches of the Service Agreement." (R. 1199.)
7
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On October 18, 2011, Faulconer emailed Beckman to invite her to have a call the
next day to discuss with him a resolution of the parties' disputes. (R. 1192.) The email
twice stated his understanding that the call would be for settlement purposes only. (R.
1192.) Beckman responded the following morning, prior to the anticipated call, and
encouraged Faulconer to "solicit legal counsel" to advise Franchise Foundry. (R. 1193.)
~

On October 19, 2011, Beckman and Faulconer engaged in lengthy compromise
negotiations by phone in an attempt to settle their disputes. (R. 1027, 1209.) Beckman
recorded the phone call and later attempted to introduce the recording of the conversation
(the "Recording") at trial. (R. 1027.) At the outset of the call, Faulconer again expressed
his view that "this whole conversation ... is really just for settlement purposes only." (R.
1027.) He stated that "anything we say on this call is that ... we're trying to reach a
settlement," so "let's just be really frank and honest and try to make this work." (R.
1027.) Beckman agreed that the call "[was] for settlement purposes only." (R. 1209.)
After Beckman and Faulconer discussed a number of different aspects of the parties'
disputes, Beckman made an offer to settle: she demanded that Franchise Foundry
abandon its interest in Cybertary, and return complete ownership of Cybertary to
Beckman. (R. 1208.) For his part, Faulconer proposed a "good faith token" payment of
$2,000.00 and stated that he and Beckman would continue working toward a resolution.
(R. 1208.)
The day after the October 19, 2011 conversation, Beckman made the following
proposal with respect to a good faith payment:

8

uP
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In return for an immediate good faith payment of not less than $5,000 ...
[Beckman] will refrain from initiating litigation for a week and, so long as
[she is] paid all amounts [she is] owed before 10/31/11, and the terms of
our agreements are fully met going forward, will not pursue claims to
additional ownership.
(R. 1208.) In response, after reiterating to Beckman that his email was for settlement
purposes only, Faulconer and Beckman discussed how Cybertary should pay Beckman
the good faith payment she requested. (R. 1208.)
The parties' compromise negotiations failed to resolve their disputes and Beckman
sued Cybertary on November 2, 2011 (R. 5.) On November 14, 2011 Cybertary sent
Beckman a letter (the "Termination Letter") notifying her that her employment was
terminated and that the termination was "for cause" within the meaning of the
Employment Agreement. (R. 398.) As grounds for termination, Cybertary stated that it
had "reason to believe that [Beckman] engaged in an intimate relationship with a
representative of one ofCybertary's key vendors." (R. 398.) Cybertary asserted that
Beckman' s actions "caused Cybertary to distance itself from that vendor in connection
with the termination of [Beckman's] relationship with that vendor." (R. 398.) Though it
used the word "intimate" in the Termination Letter and believed that the relationship was
professionally inappropriate, Cybertary later emphasized that it did not know or consider
relevant whether that relationship was a sexual relationship. (R. 628.) The Termination
Letter also cited Beckman 's failure "to perform certain crucial duties related to
[Beckman's] responsibility" as Cybertary's CEO as additional grounds for termination.
The Termination Letter stated Cybertary's belief that those shortcomings constituted
9
~
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"habitual neglect," "dereliction" of duty, and/or "material misconduct" under Paragraph
6(b) of the Employment Agreement. (R. 398.) The Termination Letter did not purport to
exhaustively set forth Beckman's conduct constituting grounds for termination and, in
fact, expressly disclaimed any intent "to be a comprehensive list of all of Cybertary's
grounds for terminating [Beckman's] employment for cause." (R. 398.) Cybertary
"reserve[d] the right to articulate additional grounds for terminating [Beckman's]
employment for cause." (R. 398.)
The Litigation
On November 21, 2011, Beckman filed an Amended Complaint naming Franchise
Foundry, FFH, Faulconer, and Hicks as defendants. 4 (R. 17.) Beckman alleged that
Appellees breached the Employment Agreement and its implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to pay Beckman her wages and benefits. (R. 13.) Beckman
also alleged that Faulconer and Franchise Foundry "interfered with Beckman's ability to
perform her duties as" Cybertary's CEO. (R. 13.) Beckman also requested a declaratory
judgment establishing that (1) her termination was improper, (2) Beckman's termination
was in retaliation for her lawsuit against Cybertary, (3) Beckman had met her obligations
under the Employment Agreement and Operating Agreement and no cause existed for her
termination, and (4) "Faulconer and Franchise Foundry have not acted in good faith and
are therefore liable for any damages suffered by Beckman as a result of their actions."

4

Beckman never served FFH or Hicks, and they are not parties to this appeal. See
Appellant's Br. 6 n.1.
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(R. 11.) Cybertary filed its answer on December 9, 2011. (R. 19.) Cybertary also
asserted a counterclaim against Beckman in the amount of $373,500.00 for torts
Beckman committed against Cybertary, and for injunctive relief. 5 (R. 1288.)
On March 15, 2013, Beckman sought leave to again amend her complaint to assert
additional claims against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry including claims for breaches
of the Operating Agreement, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraudulent Inducement, Civil
Conspiracy, and Unjust Enrichment. (R. 174-80.) Beckman submitted her motion for
leave to amend on or about April 5, 2013, and the district court heard the motion on May
28, 2013. (R. 328-29, 344.) The district court denied Beckman's motion for leave to
amend on May 30, 2013. (R. 351.) The district court stated: "The Court FINDS that the
Motion was untimely and the product of unreasonable delay, and that Defendants would
be prejudiced if Beckman were permitted to file her proposed Second Amended
Complaint." (R. 351.)
Approximately two months later, Beckman filed a second lawsuit in Fourth
District Court (Case No. 130401013, Beckman v. Franchise Foundry, LLC et al.) (the
"Second Lawsuit") asserting the very claims that the district court had refused to join to
this case. (R. 1111-13.) Appellees moved for summary judgment in the Second Lawsuit
based, in principal part, on the doctrines of res judicata and claim splitting. (R. 1111.)
The court in the Second Lawsuit eventually stayed that case pending the outcome of this

5

Faulconer and Franchise Foundry moved to dismiss Beckman's claims against them.
The Court eventually denied the motion, ruling from the bench (R. 13 8.) and, a month
later on May 29, 2012, signing a written order denying the motion (R. 146.).
11
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case. (R. 1111.)
In the meantime, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment in this case. (R.

455-56.) The district court dismissed Beckman's contract claims against Faulconer and
Franchise Foundry but otherwise denied the parties' cross-motions. (R. 897-98.) In
dismissing Beckman' s contract claims against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry, the
district court reasoned that "[i]t is not disputed that neither Franchise Foundry nor
Faulconer are parties to that Employment Agreement." (R. 897.)
The Jury Trial
The parties proceeded to a four-day jury trial on their remaining claims in October
2014. Prior to trial, Appellees filed four motions in limine, one of which was a motion to
exclude the Recording. (R. 1022-28.) The Court granted the motion to exclude the
Recording. (R. 1469.) The district court concluded:
Beckman may not introduce [the Recording]. The Court finds, after
listening to the Recording, that the statements captured therein constitute
compromise negotiations. For this reason and others given on the record at
the hearing, the Recording is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence
408 for the purposes Beckman offers it.

(R. 1469.)
Prior to instructing the jury, the district court resolved the parties' dispute over the
proper instruction regarding "cause" for Beckman's termination. (R. 1374-75.)
Beckman' s proposed instruction would have required Appellees to prove that the conduct
underlying Beckman's termination actually occurred and that it met one or more of the
grounds for termination in the Employment Agreement. (R. 1374-75.) Appellees
12
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objected to Beckman's proposed instruction and pointed out that Beckman's instruction
was incomplete under this Court's holdings in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy,
2005 UT App 92, 110 P.3d 168. (R. 1399-1401.) Appellees suggested that the district
court add an additional paragraph after Beckman's proposed instruction. (R. 1399-14.)
The district court agreed with Appellees, and the final instruction read as follows:
You must decide whether there was "cause for Cybertary's termination of
Beckman's employment. "Cause" has been defined in section 6 of the
Employment Agreement and requires Cybertary to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, one of the following:
(VIII)
"Executive's commission of a felony of any kind or any other
crime (whether it is a felony or not) involving securities fraud, theft, or
moral turpitude";
(IX)
"Executive's willful breach, habitual neglect, gross neglect,
or dereliction of Executive's duties under this Agreement";
(X)
"Executive's material misconduct with regard to the
Company, including, but not limited to, Executive's failure to comply with
Company's written rules and policies";
(XI)
"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise,
that discredits the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the
Company or the Company's results of operations or business";
(XII)
"Any act by Executive of sexual harassment (or Executive's
creating a hostile work environment) or any other activity of Executive
prohibited by state, local, and/or federal law with respect to discrimination
based on age, sex, race, religion, or national origin";
(XIII)
"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise,
that discredits the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the
Company or the Company's results of operations or business;" and/or
(XIV)
Any breach of any Executive's obligation under the
Inventions, Confidentiality, and Restrictive Covenant Agreement referred
to below.
(See section 6(b) of the Employment Agreement)
In determining whether Cybertary breached the Employment
Agreement by inaccurately determining that one or more of these
definitions of "cause" existed, you must remember that the determination of
whether one or more of these definitions was satisfied was a matter for
13
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Cybertary's good business judgment. So long as Cybertary possessed a fair
and honest cause or reason, in good faith, that met one of these definitions,
cause existed to terminate Beckman, whether or not the facts that Cybertary
believed to be true really, in fact, were true.
(R. 1481-82.)
At trial, Beckman sought $235,041.05 in damages. (R. 1507.)6 Cybertary
presented evidence-Beckman' s own Trial Exhibit 28-that Beckman regularly accessed
Cybertary's bank accounts for her personal use (including, without limitation payment of
attorney fees incurred in connection with Beckman' s personal bankruptcy and other
expenses unrelated to Cybertary's business). (R. 1747.)
The jury found that Cybertary breached the Employment Agreement "by failing to
pay [Beckman] her compensation and benefits" even though Beckman was Cybertary's
sole officer and responsible for ensuring her own payment. (R. 1497.) The jury rejected
Beckman' s claim that Cybertary breached the Employment Agreement "by terminating
[Beckman] without cause." (R. 1497.) The jury also rejected Beckman's claim that
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer acted "with gross negligence or willful misconduct."
vJj

(R. 1496-97.) The jury awarded Beckman $84,913.83 in unpaid salary and $18,150 in

6

The amount of damages Beckman sought fluctuated over the course of the litigation.
Beckman' s Amended Complaint sought damages in an amount then "unknown but
believed to be in excess of $300,000, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs to the fullest
extent provided by law." (R. 11.) In her initial disclosures, served September 19, 2012,
Beckman disclosed that she calculated her damages as not less than $212,264.37. (R.
1647-49.) At trial, the Court instructed the jury that "Beckman claims that Cybertary
breached the Employment Agreement by failing to pay her $205,983, 11 for salary, and
$28,897.94 for monthly benefits for the time period of June 2010 through May 2013," for
a total of $234,881.05 in claimed damages. (R. 1488.)
14
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unpaid benefits for a total of $103,063.83. The jury concluded that neither Franchise
Foundry nor Faulconer was responsible for that award. (R. 146.)
Beckman moved for attorney fees under the Employment Agreement and for
prejudgment interest on the jury award. (R. 1503-04, 1601-02.) Beckman argued that
she was entitled to prejudgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) per annum
running from November 2, 2011 (the date Beckman commenced this lawsuit) through
October 10, 2014, the date of the jury verdict. (R. 1602.) Appellees also moved for
attorney's fees. (R. 1608-10.)
The Employment Agreement contains the following fee provision:

Prevailing Party; Costs. The nonprevailing party in any proceeding
hereunder shall be the party that the court of competent jurisdiction awards
less than one-half (1/2) of all of the amounts in dispute ("Nonprevailing
Party"). The Nonprevailing Party to any proceeding under this Agreement
shall pay its own expenses, the court fees, and any administrative fees
arising in connection therewith, and the expenses, including without
limitation, attorneys' fees, costs, and costs of investigation, reasonably
incurred by the other party to the proceeding.
(R. 1663.) On or about March 12, 2015, the district court entered an order disposing of
the parties' respective attorney's fees requests and Beckman's motion for prejudgment
interest. (R. 1823.) The district court granted Beckman' s fee motion in part, holding:
The Court construes [the Employment Agreement's fee provision] as
mandating an assessment of whether each party asserting a claim under the
Employment Agreement is a "nonprevailing party" under that claim.
Because Cybertary was awarded less than one-half of the amounts it sought
against Beckman, it is the nonprevailing party with respect to its
counterclaims, and it is therefore required to pay Beckman' s attorney fees
and costs incurred in defending against those claims.
(R. 1821.) The district court also granted Appellees' fee motion in part. As with
15
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Cybertary, the Court found that Beckman was a non prevailing party "having recovered
less than one half of the amount she sought against Cybertary pursuant to her claims
against it under the Employment Agreement." (R. 1821.) The district court netted
Cybertary's fee award against Beckman's and held that Cybertary owed a net $13,135.34
to Beckman. (R. 1821.) The district court further found that Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer prevailed on Beckman's claims against them under the Employment
Agreement (which the district court dismissed on summary judgment). The district court
awarded them $27,153.33 against Beckman. (R. 1820.)
The district court denied Beckman' s request for prejudgment interest, holding
"that Beckman' s damages are not the type of damages that are susceptible to an award of
prejudgment interest." (R. 1820). The district court entered final judgment in the
amounts set forth above contemporaneous with its order regarding the parties' motions.
(R. 183 0-31.) Beckman filed her notice of appeal on April 9, 2015. (R. 183 2.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court should affirm the district court. First, the district court did not abuse its
~

discretion by denying Beckman's motion for leave to amend her complaint. That motion
was prejudicially untimely. Furthermore, Beckman never offered, and does not now
offer, any persuasive rationale for why she waited so long to bring her motion.
Second, Beckman did not adequately create an appellate record sufficient to allow
the Court to review the district court's exclusion of the Recording. In any event, the
district court did not erroneously misread Utah Rule of Evidence 408 or otherwise abuse
16
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its discretion by excluding the Recording, which plainly constitutes settlement
correspondence by Beckman's own admission. Rule 408(b)(2) does not countenance the
Recording's admission. And even if the district court mistakenly excluded the
Recording, it did Beckman a favor, as the statements on the Recording are not nearly as
favorable to her as she argues.
Third, the district court properly instructed the jury regarding cause, consistent
with this Court's decision in Unitah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy. Cause-even as
defined in the Employment Agreement-should be determined by an employer in the
first instance, consistent with its reasonable business judgment.
Fourth, the district court properly awarded Franchise Foundry and Faulconer
attorney fees pursuant to the Employment Agreement. Although Beckman surely wishes
she hadn't, she plainly asserted a claim under the Employment Agreement against
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer. They are entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to
that agreement.
Fifth, the district court properly interpreted the Employment Agreement to award
Cybertary its attorney fees. Beckman' s proposed reading of Section 16 of the
Employment Agreement would, if accepted, rewrite it.
Sixth, and finally, the district court properly declined to award Beckman
prejudgment interest. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 does not apply, and even if it did,
damages were not certain enough to warrant prejudgment interest.

17
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING BECKMAN'S UNTIMELY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND HER COMPLAINT.
Leave to amend is "freely granted when justice so requires," see Utah R. Civ. P.

l 5{a), but that liberality is "limited, such as, for example, when it would result in
prejudice ... or if the amendments would be futile." See Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010
UT 68, 1 15, 243 P.3d 1275. District courts exercise their discretion in making this
determination. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1281
(Utah 1998) ("In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to amend, [the Court] will
affirm the denial unless the trial court abused its discretion."). "Utah courts ... consider
the following factors in determining whether to allow amendment: ( 1) the timeliness of
the motion; (2) the justification for delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the
responding party." Atcitty v. Bd. of Educ., 967 P .2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Based on those criteria, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
~

Beckman' s motion for leave to amend. The following sections explain why.

A.

Beckman's Motion for Leave to Amend Her Complaint Was Not
Timely.

"[M]otions to amend are typically deemed untimely when they are filed in the
advanced procedural stages of the litigation process, such as after the completion of
discovery." Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44,129, 87 P.3d 734.
Furthermore, "regardless of the procedural posture of the case, motions to amend have
18
~
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typically been deemed untimely when they were filed several years into the litigation."
Id.
At the outset, Beckman miscalculates key deadlines pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 26. Under the version of that rule in effect as of the date Beckman
commenced her lawsuit, 7 Tier 3 fact discovery expired 210 days "from the date the first
defendant's first disclosure is due." See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5) (Nov. 1, 2011). The
first defendant's initial disclosures were due "within 28 days after the plaintiffs first
disclosure or after that defendant's appearance, whichever is later." See id. 26(a)(2)(B)
(Nov. 1, 2011). A plaintiff's initial disclosure was due "within 14 days after service of
the first answer to the complaint." See id. 26(a) (Nov. 1, 2011 ). Cybertary filed its
answer on December 9, 2011 (R. 19.), making Beckman's initial disclosures due on
January 9, 2012. But Beckman did not serve her initial disclosures until September 19,
2012, 254 days, or approximately eight months, after the date they were actually due. (R.
278.) That means that Appellees' initial disclosures were due 28 days after that, or
October 22, 2012. 210 days from October 22, 2012, expired on May 20, 2013. (R. 308.)8

7

Rule 26 was amended on April 1, 2013, sixteen days after Beckman filed her motion for
leave to amend. (R. 165-66.)

8

And Appellees' initial disclosures were served only twenty-one days late, and not "two
months after fact discovery closed," as Beckman argues. See Appellant's Br. at 52.
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Beckman' s reliance upon the wrong version of the rule obfuscates the fact that it was she
who allowed her case to languish for eight months while doing nothing with it. 9
With these deadlines, the district court plainly did not abuse its discretion by
deeming Beckman's motion untimely. Beckman filed that motion on March 15, 2013.
Based on the briefing schedules set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7, plus an
expected period to schedule oral argument, the Court could not even rule on Beckman's
motion prior to the expiration of fact discovery. Indeed, the Court did not even hear
argument on Beckman's motion until May 28, 2013, after the expiration of fact
discovery. (R. 344.) Throughout all of this, Beckman never sought extraordinary
discovery.
Beckman did not bring her motion in time for Appellees to do any discovery
regarding her new claims. She filed it in the "advanced procedural stages of the litigation
process," and for all intents and purposes "after the completion of discovery." See Kelly,
2004 UT App 44,

~

29. Furthermore, she brought her motion years into the litigation-

specifically, eighteen months after commencing her lawsuit. See id. ("[M]otions to

9

Beckman' s argument that "[t]his case logically could not progress until the motion to
dismiss-filed by Franchise Foundry and Faulconer-was denied on May 29, 2012"
ignores four key points. First, although the order denying Appellees' motion was entered
on May 29, 2012, the Court denied the motion from the bench a month earlier, on April
27, 2012. (R. 138.) Second, Cybertary answered. Only Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer sought dismissal. Their motion did not affect Cybertary, and no version of
Rule 26-past or present-stays discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending. Third,
Beckman still waited nearly four months after the Court's order, and five months from its
oral ruling, to even serve her initial disclosures. And fourth, the record is devoid of any
effort by Beckman to modify Rule 26's presumptive dates.
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amend have typically been deemed untimely when they were filed several years into the
litigation."). The district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming Beckman's
motion for leave to amend untimely filed.

B.

Beckman Offers No Persuasive Justification for Her Delay.

Beckman argues that her bankruptcy justified her delay in seeking leave to amend
her claims because "the bankruptcy estate included Beckman' s interest in this litigation
and moving forward with new and plausible claims for relief would have increased the
likelihood that the trustee would have seized those claims and listed them in her final
report." See Appellant's Br. at 53. Her argument fails, decisively, for several reasons.
First, Beckman ties her argument to a demonstrably false misstatement of the
record. She claims that she "file[d] bankruptcy on May 20, 2012," and that Beckman's
"previous counsel withdrew from the case four days later." See Appellant's Br. at 53.
But Beckman' s own Amended Complaint alleges that she filed for bankruptcy on May
20, 2011, not May 20, 2012. (R. at 14-15.) 10 (Beckman's Amended Complaint
incorrectly notes May 24, 2011, as the date.) Beckman gets this date wrong by a year.
The correct date indicates that her bankruptcy played no chronological role in her ability
to assert claims.

10

Beckman states the correct date at least twice in her brief, but also states this incorrect
date no fewer than 3 times. See Appellant's Br. at 5, 15 (correct date); 7, 19, 53
(incorrect dates). Perplexingly, the incorrect date is the one upon which she actually
bases her argument. See id. at 53.
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Second, Beckman alleges in her own Amended Complaint that "[t]he amounts due
to Beckman accruing on or before May 24 th [2011] will be addressed through the
bankruptcy proceeding. Beckman asserted no claim for any amount owed her that
th

accrued on or before May 24 [2011]." (R. 14-15.) It is therefore not the case that
Beckman was concerned about claims being seized by the bankruptcy trustee. She based
her own damages calculation on amounts allegedly owed that arose post-petition.
Third, Beckman' s argument that she did not assert her new claims because she
feared that the bankruptcy trustee would seize her claims might bestow upon Beckman
more consequences than she bargains for. 18 U.S.C. § 152 subjects to criminal
punishment any person who "knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian,
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court ... any property belonging to the estate of a
debtor." See 11 U.S.C. § 152(1 ). If Beckman did not assert her claims out of an effort to
conceal them from the trustee-which appears to be her argument-this Court should not
countenance that scheme by reversing the district court's refusal to allow her to assert
that claim.

"'

11

Fourth, Beckman' s miscalculation of the Rule 26 deadlines in effect as of the date
she filed her case, as well as her motion for leave to amend, hides key a chronological
reality: Beckman did nothing to advance her case until September 19, 2012, when she

11

~

Even so, Beckman ultimately did seek leave to amend her complaint to assert these
new claims. That compels a question: if she could seek to assert those claims on March
15, 2012, why couldn't she have sought to assert those claims earlier? Plainly, her
bankruptcy didn't prevent her from asserting them earlier. She just didn't want to assert
them earlier, for strategic ( and possibly illegitimate) reasons.
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served her initial disclosures-approximately eight months late. Indeed, it appears to
have been the district court's February 28, 2013, order to show cause that prompted
Beckman to start prosecuting her case. (R. 162.) Beckman offers no persuasive
'justification for [her] delay"; she simply wasn't prosecuting her case until the Court
made her. See Atcitty, 967 P.2d at 1264.
Sixth, and finally, Beckman's proposed second amended complaint sought to
assert claims that all arose prior to November 2011, when she filed her initial complaint.
In other words, all of the facts upon which Beckman based her proposed second amended
complaint were available to her when she filed her initial complaint, and certainly her
Amended Complaint. Beckman' s excuse for why she didn't bring her claims earlierthat she was waiting for an order discharging her debts, is unpersuasive. See Appellant's
Br. 52-54. Her debts have nothing to do with the claims she asserts in this lawsuit. Her
own Amended Complaint makes clear that she sought only post-petition amounts
allegedly owed to her. (R. 14-15.)
The record simply does not reflect any persuasive, or legitimate, reason for why
Beckman waited so long to bring her claims.
C.

Beckman 's Delay In Seeking Leave to Amend Prejudiced Appellees.

Untimeliness qualifies as impermissible ''prejudice" when the prejudice is
"unavoidable," see Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah 1998),
and deprives an opposing party of an adequate "opportunity ... to meet the newly raised
matter," see Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation
23
~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

marks omitted). Based on that standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Beckman' s delay worked unavoidable prejudice upon Appellees.
The district court docket tells the story: Beckman brought her motion for leave to
amend approximately one month prior to the expiration of fact discovery. (R. 165-66.)
That month was consumed with briefing Beckman' s motion and scheduling oral
argument. By the time the Court heard oral argument on Beckman's motion, on May 28,
2013, fact discovery had already expired. (R. 352.) And Beckman never moved for
extraordinary discovery. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(6). Therefore, had the district court
granted Beckman' s motion, Appellees would have had no time to conduct discovery on
Beckman's new claims. It was certainly within the Court's discretion to determine that
the timing of Beckman' s motion deprived Appellees of an adequate "opportunity ... to
meet the newly raised matter[s]." See Timm, 851 P.2d at 1183.
Furthermore, make no mistake about it: Beckman's proposed amended complaint
contained numerous "newly raised matter[s]." Indeed, it sought to expand Beckman's
claims from three (breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and declaratory
relief) to seven, including claims of fraud. (R. 169.) Those new claims would have
required inquiry into a host of new facts, including misrepresentations, reliance, and
additional measures of damages.
Based on the foregoing, the district court in no way abused its discretion by
declining to allow Beckman to amend her claims.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COUT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
EXCLUDING THE RECORDING FROM EVIDENCE.
Utah Rule of Evidence 408 provides:
Evidence of the following is not admissible either to prove or disprove
liability for or the validity or amount of a disputed claim ... ( 1) furnishing,
promising, or offering-or accepting, promising to accept or offering to
accept-a valuable consideration in order to compromise or attempt to
compromise the claims; and (2) conduct or a statement made in
compromise negotiations.

Utah R. Evid. 408(a). The purpose of Rule 408 "is to promote nonjudicial settlement of
disputes" by encouraging open dialogue. See Eisenberg v. Univ. ofNM, 936 F.2d 1131,
1134 (10th Cir. 1991 ). 12 Beckman challenges the district court's exclusion of the
Recording pursuant to Rule 408. For the following reasons, her argument fails.

A.

The Court Cannot Review the District Court's Exclusion of the
Recording, Because Beckman Has Not Created a Complete Record on
Appeal.

As a threshold matter, the Court should decline to address this issue because the
Recording is not properly part of the appellate record. Utah appellate courts "cannot
consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true but absent in the official record."

See, e.g., Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1963); Blodgett v. Zions First
Nat. Bank, 752 P .2d 901, 904 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("[F]acts asserted in briefs, even

12

In 1991, the Utah Supreme Court noted that Utah Rule of Evidence 408 "follows
verbatim Federal Rule of Evidence 408 which was used as a model in drafting the Utah
rules. Accordingly, this court looks to federal law interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence
408 to define the contours of Utah Rule of Evidence 408." See Davidson v. Prince, 813
P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1991). In 2008, this Court noted that Utah and Federal Rule 408
are no longer identical, but nevertheless looked to interpretations of the federal rule as
instructive. See Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, ,I 31, 176 P.3d 464.
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if true, but not contained in the official record will not be considered on appeal.").
Although Beckman recognizes that the Recording is not part of the appellate record, she
never filed a motion to supplement the record. Beckman simply has not given this Court
enough to properly review this issue, and the Court should reject her arguments out of
hand.

B.

The Recording Constitutes Inadmissible Compromise Negotiations.

Even if the Court considers Beckman' s arguments, and the Recording, it should
affirm the district court. The course of events before, during, and after the conversation
demonstrate that both parties meant the conversation as a forum for compromise
negotiations.

I.

Both parties made statements indicating their intent to treat the
recorded conversation as compromise negotiations, and the context
of the conversation so indicates.

At the outset of the Recording, Faulconer stated "this whole conversation ... is
really just for settlement purposes only." (R. 1027.) He also stated that "anything we say
on this call is that ... we're trying to reach a settlement," so "let's just be really frank and
ltJ

honest and try to make this work." (R. 1027.) Beckman, for her part, agreed. About
twenty minutes into the Recording, Beckman states her understanding that the call "[was]
for settlement purposes only." (R. 1209.) With these statements, there can be no doubt
that the Recording is evidence of a settlement communications and is circumscribed in
the parties' compromise negotiations. Indeed, Faulconer's statement that he wished the
parties to be "frank and honest" strikes at the core purpose of Rule 408. See Eisenberg,
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936 F.2d at 1134.
Events immediately before and after the recorded conversation further
demonstrate that the Recording evinces compromise negotiations. Several items of
correspondence leading up to the recorded conversation mention the parties' dispute.
First, on October 11, 2011, Beckman sent an email to Faulconer and others outlining a
number of grievances against Franchise Foundry and declining to renew the service
agreement. (R. 1210.) Later, after Beckman's termination, Beckman referenced the
earlier email and noted that she had, at that earlier time prior to the recorded
conversation, "let [Faulconer] know that [Beckman] had cause for a lawsuit against
Franchise Foundry for multiple breaches of the Service Agreement, and that [she] still
expected they would fulfill their contractual commitments since they had been paid for
them." (R. 1210.) Second, also on October 11, 2011, before the recorded conversation,
Beckman's then-counsel sent Franchise Foundry a letter demanding payment of
compensation to which Beckman contended she was entitled. The letter threatened
litigation unless Franchise Foundry caused Cybertary to compensate Beckman. (R.
1210.) The demand letter raised various other disputed issues arising out of the parties'
operating agreement and suggested that Beckman had a number of "other claims or rights
to redress" in addition to her unpaid wage claim. (R. 1209.) Third, following the
October 11, 2011 demand letter, Beckman and Faulconer corresponded by email to
schedule the call memorialized in the Recording. In that correspondence (the day before
the call occurred), Faulconer noted that "[t]his email and our discussion tomorrow ... are
27
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for settlement purposes only." (R. 1209-10.)
The parties' communications after the Recording further demonstrate their intent
for their conversation to constitute compromise negotiations. On October 20, 2011-the
day after the Recording-Beckman made the following settlement offer:
In return for an immediate good faith payment of not less than $5,000 ...
[she] will refrain from initiating litigation for a week and, so long as [she
is] paid all amounts [she is] owed before 10/31/11, and the terms of our
agreements are fully met going forward, will not pursue claims to
additional ownership.
(R. 1208.) Unsurprisingly, Beckman's offer contained an interim payment, just as
Faulconer's had the day before. In response to Beckman's offer, Faulconer responded by
email and stated that the email was "for settlement purposes only." (R. 1208.) The email
discussed how Beckman could obtain the good faith payment. In light of the parties'
communications after the recorded conversation, Beckman cannot argue that there was no
dispute at the time of the conversation. If there was no dispute on October 19, then
Beckman could not have, on October 20, threatened to bring a lawsuit immediately and
promise to forbear for a week only if she received $5,000.
2.

The Recording Falls Squarely Within Rule 408 's Ambit.

Beckman argues that the Recording does not evince compromise negotiations
because there was not, at that time, a dispute between the parties. But the Recording
identifies a number of disputes between Beckman and Cybertary (and Franchise
Foundry). For example (and without limitation), Beckman accused Defendants of
improperly scheming to acquire Beckman' s membership interest in Cybertary from the
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bankruptcy trustee, which Faulconer denied. (R. 1209.) The parties also discussed
grounds for Beckman' s termination for cause from Cybertary, which grounds Beckman
denied, as well as the parties' dispute regarding Beckman's alleged unpaid wages. (R.
1209.) The parties also discussed Defendants' position that Beckman alone directed how
Cybertary funds were spent and, thus, was solely responsible for her own alleged unpaid
wages. (R. 1209.) 13
Beckman suggests that the fact that the Recording exists at all demonstrates that
"she intended to use that recording at a later date, either in litigation or to contradict
Faulconer's assertions." See Appellant's Br. at 46. But this argument cuts squarely
against Beckman' s denial of the existence of a dispute between the parties. If it is true, as
Beckman argues, that no dispute existed at the time of the call there would have been no
need for her to record it for use down the road. And, of course, Beckman' s intent to rely
on inadmissible evidence does not make it admissible.

13

VP

Listening to the Recording demonstrates that Beckman's recitation of its content is
misleadingly inaccurate. Rather than admit that Cybertary lacked cause to terminate
Beckman and that she had done a good job, Faulconer noted that if Cybertary were
looking for cause to terminate Beckman's employment, it had such cause-a suggestion
Beckman disputed. (Recording at 10:00-12:10.) Faulconer further noted that it was
Beckman who, as Cybertary's CEO, chose to pay vendors instead of herself. (Recording
at 23:00-23:05.) Faulconer observed, "I don't think I had a say in, or neither did
anybody on the board except for you, have a say on where those funds went." Beckman
acknowledged that Faulconer had told her that before. (Recording at 23:30-23:56.)
Faulconer also noted, and Beckman agreed, that even if Beckman prevailed against
Cybertary, Cybertary would have no money to pay her. (Recording at 21 :50-22:30.)
Based on these and other statements on the Recording, the district court likely did
Beckman a favor by excluding the Recording. Beckman can prove no harm in its
exclusion, and this Court should therefore not reverse. See Lawrence, 2014 UT App 40,
1 16 (explaining the harmless error doctrine).
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Beckman also asserts that the Recording does not run afoul Rule 408 because the
parties transmitted no settlement offer. But Rule 408 expressly encompasses, in addition
to a settlement offer, "conduct or a statement made in compromise negotiations." See
Utah R. Evid. 408(a)(2). Further, Beckman's argument finds no support in the
Recording. At numerous places in the recording, Faulconer asks Beckman to propose a
solution to the parties' apparent impasse. In response, Beckman made an offer to settle:
she demanded that Franchise Foundry separate itself completely from Cybertary, and
return complete ownership of Cybertary to her. (R. 1208.) For his part, Faulconer
proposed a "good faith token" payment of $2,000.00 in order to facilitate further
negotiations. (R. 1208.) Beckman argues that this payment does not count as a
settlement offer because it was not for the full amount in dispute. See Appellant's Br. at
45. But nothing in Rule 408 suggests that a settlement offer must offer to resolve all
pending claims and defenses for their full amount (or that only settlement offers
themselves are inadmissible). See Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners Ass 'n, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139 (D. Utah 2002) ("Rule 408 excludes not only actual settlement
offers, but also statements made during settlement negotiations."). And, in any event,
certainly Beckman's offer for Franchise Foundry's walk-away, coupled with Faulconer's
offer of an interim payment and continued negotiations, brings the parties' respective
offers squarely within Rule 408 's reach.

3.

The conversation memorialized in the Recording was not a business
communication.

The parties' communications before, during, and after the recorded conversation
30
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foreclose Beckman's argument that these were "business communications" rather than
compromise negotiations. Beckman relies principally on Cassino v. Reichhold

Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987). Beckman's reliance is misplaced. In
Cassino, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed admission, in a federal employment
discrimination case, of a draft settlement agreement offered as part of an employee's
~

severance package. The court concluded that "[t]he termination agreements ... are
probative on the issue of discrimination." See id. The court reasoned that such
agreements are often "made part of the record in the case and are considered relevant to
the circumstances surrounding the alleged discriminatory discharge." See id. at 1342.
The court further reasoned that the purposes underlying Rule 408 do not "come into play"
where an employer "tries to condition severance pay upon the release of potential claims"
and that such "communications may also tend to be coercive rather than conciliatory."

See id. at 1342.
Here, Cassino does not control and is unpersuasive given its factual dissimilarity
to the instant case. Cassino is best read as applying to only a narrow range of federal
employment discrimination cases. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Cassino was founded
on the goals of federal anti-discrimination law, which are not applicable here. See id. at
1343. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit noted that, in certain discrimination cases (such as
the one before the court in Cassino), the settlement agreement itself is part of the
employer's discriminatory conduct and, therefore, has independent legal significance.
Such is not the case here. Beckman wanted to introduce the Recording to play to the jury
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certain "admissions" by Faulconer, not because the Recording was part of the conduct
complained of. See Appellant's Br. 43-44. Finally, in federal employment
discrimination cases like Cassino, the dispute arguably does not arise until (or after) the
"settlement offer" is given. In those cases, unlike here, the settlement agreement is given
contemporaneously with the alleged discriminatory firing. By contrast, in this case, the
alleged unpaid wages and other grievances clearly predate the recorded settlement
discussions and correspondence associated with the recorded conversation, as discussed
above. The timing of the Recording, and its context and tenor, demonstrate that it was
parties wrangling over legal issues, not engaging in "business communications."
4.

Rule 408(b)(2) does not apply.

Beckman' s last ditch argument is that, even if constituting compromise
negotiations, the Recording comes in under the Rule 408(b )(2) "exception." But Rule
408(b )(2) does not apply here. That "exception" merely states that "[t]he court is not
required to exclude evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations." See Utah R. Evid. 408(b )(2). In this case, the Court
is not asked to consider whether Beckman could have proved the facts she wanted to
present from the Recording through some other means. Beckman wanted to use a
recording of the actual compromise negotiations to prove certain alleged admissions by
Faulconer. These are the exact sort of communications Rule 408 was meant to protect.
The district court properly excluded the Recording.
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCT THE
JURY REGARDING CAUSE IN RELIANCE ON UINTAH BASIN.
The district court instructed the jury that to establish cause Cybertary must prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, one of the grounds for termination enumerated in the
Employment Agreement. (R. 1481-82.) These grounds included, among other things:
~

(ii)

(iii)

(vi)

"Executive's willful breach, habitual neglect, gross neglect, or dereliction
of Executive's duties under this Agreement;"
"Executive's material misconduct with regard to the Company, including,
but not limited to, Executive's failure to comply with Company's written
rules and policies;"
"Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise, that discredits
the Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the Company or the
Company's results of operations or business"

(R. 78-79.) The district court correctly recognized that Beckman's proposed instruction,
without more, was an incomplete and misleading statement of the law. The district court
offered this important qualifier to round out the applicable law:
In determining whether Cybertary breached the Employment Agreement by
inaccurately determining that one or more of these definitions of "cause"
existed, you must remember that the determination of whether one or more
of these definitions was satisfied was a matter for Cybertary's good
business judgment. So long as Cybertary possessed a fair and honest cause
or reason, in good faith, that met one of these definitions, cause existed to
terminate Beckman, whether or not the facts that Cybertary believed to be
true really, in fact, were true.
(R. 1481-82.) This final paragraph of the instruction borrows heavily from this Court's
language in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT App 92, ,r,r 21-23, 110 P.3d 168.

Uintah controls this case and provides two important rules of law in this area. First,
Uintah explains the definition of 'just cause" under Utah law and outlines a policy of
managerial discretion for employers to determine whether given conduct constitutes
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<ii

cause. See id.

11 14-17.

Second, Uintah sets forth what a party needs to prove to show

that cause exists. Employers are not required to prove the facts giving rise to the
termination so long as the employer can demonstrate a reasonable, good-faith belief that
the facts existed. See id. 11 20-23.
Beckman argues that Uintah does not control because the employment contract at
issue in that case allowed termination for just cause rather than enumerated grounds as in
the Employment Agreement. However, the factual gap between this case and Uintah is
not nearly as wide as Beckman argues. And Uintah is not so readily restricted to its facts.
In Uintah, a hospital sued a former employee doctor to establish that it had
terminated the doctor for cause. 2005 UT App 92, 1 2. The relevant employment
agreement allowed termination for "just cause," which was not defined in the
employment agreement. See id. The doctor argued that "just cause" allowed termination
for only "a few specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, or if the hospital no
longer required pathology services." See id.

1 6.

As such, the first issue presented to the

Court was whether the employment agreement gave "just cause" a unique meaning or
whether it was subject to the general definition of the term. See id.

1 17.

The Court

concluded the latter and defined 'just cause" as the employer's "power to terminate an
employee for legitimate business reasons and in the interest of improving client services
as long as the justification is not a mere pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or illegal
termination." See id. The Court reasoned that "[i]n deciding whether Oust] cause exists,
there must be a balance between the employer's interest in operating its business
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efficiently and profitably and the employee's interest in continued employment. ... Care
must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer's legitimate exercise of
managerial discretion." See id.

~

16.

Although the Court defined "just cause," it did not make the ultimate
determination of whether "just cause" existed for the doctor's termination. See id.

~

20.

Instead, it remanded to allow the district court to determine whether the hospital
terminated the doctor "for legitimate business reasons or whether the termination was
capricious, in bad faith, or illegal." See id. The Court also addressed "the question of
what an employer must show to prove it terminated an employee for just cause." See id.
~

21. The Court discussed three approaches to the question and noted that U.S. courts

have generally followed one of the three approaches. First, "[s]ome courts seem to give
deference to the justifications stated by the employer." See id. Second, "[a] few other
courts have taken the opposite approach and required the employer to prove that the
conditions necessitating termination actually existed." See id. Third, "[a] far greater
number of states have adopted a more balanced approach that requires an employer to
justify termination with an objective good faith reason supported by facts reasonably
believed to be true by the employer." See id.~ 22. The Court followed the majority rule
and adopted the "objective reasonableness approach." See id.

~

23. It concluded that the

hospital "need not prove that [its] assumptions in terminating [the doctor] were true or
that the benefits it expected were actually realized." See id. "Rather, [the hospital] need
only show that [it] acted in good faith by adequately considering the facts it reasonably
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believed to be true at the time it made the decision." See id.
Both holdings discussed above are relevant to this case. Granted, the Employment
Agreement at issue here contains a list of grounds for termination rather than merely an
undefined reference to "just cause." Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning in Uintah is still
pertinent. When asked to decide whether given conduct constitutes "cause," courts do
not second guess "the employer's legitimate exercise of managerial discretion." See

Uintah, 2005 UT App 92, , 16. And Cybertary had to utilize that discretion in
terminating Beckman. Although the Employment Agreement enumerated general
grounds for cause, rather than an undefined articulation of '1ust cause," the enumerated
grounds are no more instructive and offer no more practical guidance. What conduct
constitutes "dereliction of ... duties," or "material misconduct," or conduct that
"discredits" Cybertary? (R. at 1481-82.) The Employment Agreement does not answer
that question, and those terms are not as insusceptible to interpretation as, say, "failing to
timely disclose a personal bankruptcy." Uintah teaches that such definitions, like 'just
cause" generally, must be interpreted and applied, in the first instance, by the employer.
As such, even if reasonable minds may differ regarding whether specific conduct falls
within one of the broadly enumerated grounds above, Cybertary had discretion under

Uintah to hold Beckman 's conduct up to the enumerated grounds and determine if cause
existed. The Court should not second guess Cybertary's good business judgment so long
as the grounds for termination were "not a mere pretext for a capricious, bad faith, or
illegal termination." See Uintah, 2005 UT App 92, , 17.
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The Court's other holding in Unitah discussed above-adopting the objective
reasonableness approach-is even more important in this case. The objective
reasonableness approach deals not so much with the definition of "cause" or what
conduct may amount to cause. Rather, it deals with what the employer must prove to
establish cause for termination. Under Uintah, Cybertary need not prove that Beckman
actually engaged in the conduct amounting to grounds for termination. Cybertary need
only show that it "acted in good faith by adequately considering the facts it reasonably
believed to be true at the time it made the decision." See id. ,I 23.
In light of the objective reasonableness approach enunciated in Uintah, the district
court did not err when it gave Jury Instruction No. 12. The instruction correctly
encapsulates the balance the Court struck in Uintah in that it places the burden of proof
on Cybertary to show grounds for termination by a preponderance of the evidence. At
the same time, the instruction reflects the appropriate deference that courts give to
employers to decide (reasonably and in good faith) what conduct constitutes grounds for
termination. The instruction states, as the Court did in Uintah, that Cybertary was not
~

required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct giving rise to
termination occurred but only that Cybertary had a reasonable, good-faith basis to believe
it did.
Beckman argues that the district court's reference to the preponderance of the
evidence standard, coupled with the last paragraph, makes the instruction ambiguous and
self-contradictory. But Beckman's argument relies on a strained reading of the
37
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instruction and sidesteps the most straightforward reading. The district court correctly
stated that Cybertary had the burden to prove cause by a preponderance of the evidence,
and that cause turns on the general criteria set forth in the Employment Agreement. The
last paragraph accurately characterizes how Cybertary must prove cause by a
preponderance of the evidence and with reference to the criteria in the Employment
Agreement: not the fact of Beckman's actual conduct, but rather Cybertary's reasonable
belief. 14
Finally, according to Beckman, if this Court affirms, it "would mean that no
matter how an employer and employee define 'cause' for the employee's termination, the
employer can take comfort in knowing that a reviewing court will simply disregard that
definition and insert the 'just cause' language from Uintah Basin"-in Beckman's view,
a "troubling ramification[]." See id. Beckman's attempt to paint a bleak picture ignores
Uintah and the boundaries it sets upon an employer's determination. Beckman also

ignores the Employment Agreement, which sets further parameters (however subject to
interpretation) upon an employer's determination. And Beckman 's suggested approach,

14

Even if the district court's instruction was ambiguous, there can be is no argument that
the ambiguity prejudiced Beckman. If anything, the district court's reference to the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard would have led the jury to believe that
Cybertary had to prove that Beckman engaged in the conduct giving rise to termination,
rather than merely Cybertary's good faith belief that it occurred. Any ambiguity would
have inured to Beckman's benefit by evoking the higher standard the Court expressly
rejected in Uintah. See Uintah, 2005 UT App 92, 1 21. As such, there is no
"possibility," much less a "reasonable likelihood" that any error tainted the jury's verdict.
See State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228, ,I 15, 311 P.3d 538. Any error was harmless. See
id.
38
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if accepted, has "troubling ramifications," as every termination-whether for "just
cause," or "dereliction of duties," or "material misconduct," or any other standard
invoking discretion and judgment-would be subject to second-guessing in litigation.
That is not the teaching of Uintah. Only a policy of deference to an employer's
reasonable, good faith managerial discretion will adequately preserve the employer's
right to direct its business operations (while still protecting the employee's right to
continued employment). See id.

~

16. The district court's instruction properly reflected

this balance and was not error.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY AW ARD
FRANCHISE FOUNDRY AND FAULCONER THEIR ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS.
Try as Beckman might to argue otherwise, she asserted a claim for breach of the

Employment Agreement against both Franchise Foundry and Faulconer. In her Amended
Complaint, Beckman captioned her First Claim for Relief as "Breach of Employment
Agreement." (R. at 13.) Paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint provided as follows:
In retaliation for filing this lawsuit, Faulconer and Franchise
Foundry have attempted on behalf of Cybertary to terminate Beckman as
Chief Executive Officer for Cybertary. Faulconer and Franchise Foundry
have interfered with Beckman' s ability to perform her duties as Chief
Executive Officer of Cybertary. Such retaliation and actions on behalf of
Cybertary further constitute a material breach of the Employment
Agreement.
(R. at 13 (emphasis added).) And paragraph 1 ofBeckman's prayer for relief specifies
the relief she sought on her First Claim for Relief, which was a claim for breach of the
Employment Agreement asked for "a money judgment against Cybertary, Franchise
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Foundry and Faulconer in an amount to be proven at trial." (R. at 11 emphasis added).)
Beckman's attempt to sidestep the Amended Complaint's plain language boils down to:
"How could I sue Franchise Foundry and Faulconer under the Employment Agreement?
They aren't even parties." Appellees do not quibble with the logic of Beckman's
argument; she absolutely shouldn't have sued Franchise Foundry and Faulconer under the
Employment Agreement. But that does not mean that Beckman did not assert that claim.
Plainly, she did. The district court recognized this. On January 2, 2014, the Court
entered summary judgment against Beckman, and in favor of Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer, on Beckman's First Claim for Relief, on the ground that neither Franchise
Foundry nor Faulconer were parties to the Employment Agreement. (R. at 897-98.)
The district court properly awarded attorney fees to Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer under the Employment Agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 provides as
follows:

~

A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party
to recover fees.
(Emphasis added.) Decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court apply § 78B-5826 to this case. In Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041, the Utah Supreme
Court construed§ 78B-5-826's predecessor as giving rise to a basis for attorney fees "if
two main conditions are met. First, the civil action must be 'based upon any promissory
note, written contract, or other writing.' And second, 'the provisions of the promissory
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note, written contract, or other writing' must 'allow at least one party to recover fees."

See id.

1 14.

The Utah Supreme Court determined that the first condition was satisfied

because the claim at issue was "based entirely upon the personal guaranty." See id.

1

15. The second condition was likewise satisfied because "the guaranty provides for an
award of attorney fees and costs to" the defendants." See id. 116. The Utah Supreme
Court specifically noted that "[a]lthough the guaranty itself was rendered unenforceable
by the failure of a condition precedent, the language of the statute focuses on the
provisions of the writing rather than its legal effect." See id.
This Court applied Bilanzich in Hooban v. Unicity International, Inc., 2009 UT
App 287, 220 P.3d 485. There, this Court framed the issue on appeal as "whether the
district court correctly determined that section 78B-5-816 does not apply to a request for
attorney fees incurred from defending against a contract-based suit where the party to the
litigation seeking to enforce the contract is found not to be a party to that contract." See

id.

1 7.

In reversing the district court, this Court relied upon Bilanzich to observe that the

plaintiff "brought suit against [the defendant] as if he were a party to the [c] ontract,
vi

attempting to enforce the [c]ontract and even seeking attorney fees under its provisions."

See id.

1 10.

According to this Court, "[t]hat [the plaintiff] was not found to be a party to

the [c]ontract does not bar application of section 78B-5-826 because the statute 'requires
only that a party to the litigation assert the [contract's] enforceability as basis for
recovery."' See id. (quoting Bilaznich, 2007 UT 26, 1 15) (emphasis in original).
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So long as a contract forms the basis of the claim, and the contract allows at least
one party to recover attorney fees, any party may recover attorney fees. The identity of
parties to the contract and the enforceability of the contract do not matter. As a matter of
law, Beckman brought a claim for breach of the Employment Agreement against
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer. Even though neither Franchise Foundry nor Faulconer
were parties to the Employment Agreement and cannot enforce it themselves, the
Employment Agreement formed the premise of Beckman's claim, and it allows Beckman
to recover fees had she prevailed. Section 78B-5-826 allows Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer to recover attorney fees.
The only remaining question is whether the district court properly exercised its
discretion pursuant to § 78B-5-826 to award fees. This Court should not second-guess
that decision. Section 78B-5-826 is intended to ''create[] a level playing field" for parties
to a contract dispute. See Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., 2001 UT
App 341, 111, 37 P.3d 267. Further,§ 78B-5-826 "rectifies the inequitable common law
result where a party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has
a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the contract." See
Bilaznich, 2007 UT 26, 1 18. "[T]o further the statute's purpose, the exposure to the risk

of a contractual obligation to pay attorney fees must give rise to a corresponding risk of a
statutory obligation to pay fees." Id. "In exercising their discretion ... district courts
should award fees liberally under[§ 78B-5-826] where pursuing or defending an action
results in an unequal exposure to the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees." Id.
42
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Furthermore, among other policy considerations, "in cases where multiple defendants are
involved, such as this one, the district court may limit the award of attorney fees to the
losing party's equitable share of the total amount." Id.

,r 21.

The district court plainly exercised its discretion properly. Beckrnan's assertion of
an Employment Agreement-based claim against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer, who
are not parties to the Employment Agreement, creates an uneven playing field. On the
face of the Employment Agreement, Beckman could have recovered fees, but Franchise
Foundry and Faulconer could not. Section 78B-5-826 is needed to level the playing field.
The Court should affirm the district court's similar conclusion.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRET
SECTION 16 OF THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT TO A WARD
CYBERTARY ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS.

Section 16 of the Employment Agreement is a strange animal. It provided:

~

Prevailing Party; Costs. The nonprevailing party in any proceeding
hereunder shall be the party that the court of competent jurisdiction awards
less than one-half (1/2) of all of the amounts in dispute ("Nonprevailing
Party"). The Nonprevailing Party to any proceeding under this Agreement
shall pay its own expenses, the court fees, and any administrative fees
arising in connection therewith, and the expenses, including without
limitation, attorneys' fees, costs, and costs of investigation, reasonably
incurred by the other party to the proceeding.
(R. at 77 (emphasis added).) When construing an attorney fee provision, like Section 16,

the usual canons of contractual construction apply. "Under basic rules of contract
interpretation, courts first look to the writing alone to determine its meaning and the
intent of the contracting parties." Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ,r 44,
201 P .3d 966. "A construction which contradicts the general purpose of the contract or
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results in hardship or absurdity is presumed to be unintended by the parties." LDS Hosp.
v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1988) (quoting Prosser Comm 'n Co. v.
Guaranty Nat'! Ins. Co., 700 P.2d 1188, 1181 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985)). The Court cannot
"make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves." See Rio
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980).
This would be an easy issue but for Cybertary's counterclaim. Beckman sought
$235,041.05 in damages. (R. 1507.) She recovered only $84,913.83 in unpaid salary and
$18,150.00 in unpaid monthly benefits, for a total of $103,063.83. (R. at 1500.)
$103,063.83 is less than half of the total $235,041.05 Beckman sought in damages. Were
that the only claim in this lawsuit, Beckman would most certainly be the nonprevailing
party, and she most certainly would not be entitled to recover her attorney fees.
But Cybertary asserted a counterclaim against Beckman in the amount of
$373,500.00 for certain torts Beckman committed against Cybertary, and for injunctive
relief. (R. at 1577.) Neither Section 16 nor any other provision of the Employment
Agreement defines "all of the amounts in dispute." (R. 72-80.) That passage's meaning
u:l

is all the more jumbled by the requirement that the nonprevailing party is the party
"award[ ed]" less than half of "all of the amounts in dispute." The Employment
Agreement does not, as Beckman suggests, provide for a calculation of "all of the
amounts in dispute" as being the difference between $373,500.00 and $235,041.05, or
$138,458.95. That calculation flies in the face of Section 16's plain language, especially
here, where each party's claims were factually distinct and each party could have
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separately recovered. And in any event, Beckman cannot argue with a straight face that
she asserted a claim for $235,041.05, but only $138,458.95 is "in dispute," as if the other
nearly $100,000 she pleaded were not amounts she actually sought, or that Cybertary did
not dispute. Indeed, the most faithful reading of Section 16's plain language would pin
"[a]ll of the amounts in dispute" as the total of Beckman's and Cybertary's claims:
~

$608,541.45.
But that, itself, would lead to a harsh, absurd result: a defendant could resist a
legitimate claim by asserting a bogus counterclaim in an astronomical amount, and then
claim that the prevailing plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees, even though the plaintiff
recovered I 00% of its claim, because the plaintiff was not "award[ ed] ... all the amounts
in dispute," because ''all of the amounts in dispute" included the bogus, astronomical
counterclaim. That harsh, absurd result cannot be what the parties intended when they
agreed to Section 16. See LDS Hosp., 765 P.2d at 860. Neither Beckman's calculation
nor that reading of Section 16 makes any sense.
The only way to read Section 16 with any fidelity to its language, and with any
common sense, is to recognize that it assesses attorney fees for each party asserting a
claim. In other words, Section 16 defines a "nonprevailing party" for each set of claims
asserted that arise out of the Employment Agreement. Here, as explained above,
Beckman recovered 1ess than half of the total $235,041.05 she sought in damages. On
her claims, she is therefore the nonprevailing party and required to pay Cybertary's
attorney fees and costs associated with that claim. On the other hand, Cybertary
45
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recovered less than half of its $373,500.00 claim. Cybertary is the nonprevailing party on
its claims and must therefore pay Beckman's attorney fees associated with that claim. 15

VI.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY DECLINE TO
AWARD PREJUDGMENT INTEREST TO BECKMAN.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 allows a court to impose prejudgment interest at 10%

per year if a contract "for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action
that is the subject of their contract" does not specify an interest rate. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 15-1-1 ( 1), (2). The Utah Supreme Court has expressed "serious reservations" that that
provision applies in any context other than a contract "for the loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action." See Consol. Coal. Co. v. Utah Div. ofState Lands &

Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 524 n.13 (Utah 1994); see also Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, Co., 2007
UT 39,, 45, 164 P.3d 353 ("This court has previously expressed the view that the
interest rate specified in section 15-1-1 (2) does not necessarily even apply in all contract
cases."). The Court should affirm the district court on that basis alone. In addition, the
Court should affirm for the following reasons.
A.

Prejudgment Interest Is Unavailable Because the Jury Had to Exercise
Its Judgment and Discretion to Award Damages.

An award of prejudgment interest is appropriate only "[w ]here the damage is
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be

15

Beckman's invocation of the "net judgment rule" and the "comparative victory" rule
are inapposite. Beckman invokes Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P .2d
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), to support both rules, but Mountain States dealt with an
attorney fee provision that was nothing like the one at issue in this case.
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measured by facts and figures." See Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201,, 64,
71 P .3d 188 (quoting Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P .2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977)). It is
inappropriate "where damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical
accuracy ... [and] the amount of the damages must be ascertained and assessed by the
trier of fact at the trial." See Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995); see
~

also Sundial, Inc. v. Villages at Wolf Hollow Condo. Homeowners Ass 'n, Inc., 2013 UT
App 223,, 8, 310 P.3d 1233. "The fact that the parties dispute ... the amount of
damages does not in and of itself mean that damages are incomplete or cannot be
calculated with mathematical accuracy." See Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App 19,, 45,
155 P.3d 917. But prejudgment interest may not be awarded where the amount of
damages had to be "determined by the broad discretion of the trier of fact." See Encon

Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,, 53,210 P.3d 263. Here, the
jury's role in determining the amount of Beckman's damage demonstrates that an award
of prejudgment interest would have been improper for at least four reasons.
First, Beckman sought damages not just for the time that she was employed with
Cybertary but for post-termination wages due to Beckman's alleged wrongful
termination. Beckman claimed that she should have been paid well into 2013. The jury
rejected Beckman's wrongful termination allegations and limited her lost wages to those
accrued prior to her November 13, 2011 termination. In doing so, the jury had to weigh
Cybertary's and Beckman's respective interests and determine that Cybertary had a "fair
and honest cause of reason, regulated by good faith" to terminate Beckman. See Uintah,
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2008 UT 15, ~ 12. As such, the jury had to apply its discretion and judgment to fix the
amount of damages to which Beckman was entitled under the Employment Agreement.
Second, the jury had to determine the amount of offset (if any) that should be
counted against Beckman for her unauthorized use of Cybertary funds. Cybertary
presented evidence-Beckman's own Trial Exhibit 28-that Beckman regularly accessed
Cybertary's bank accounts for her personal use (including, without limitation payment of
attorney fees incurred in connection with Beckman's personal bankruptcy). Testimony
conflicted on whether Beckman was actually allowed to dip into Cybertary's bank
accounts for personal use or whether she did so unilaterally and without permission.
Thus, the jury had to decide whether Beckman's claimed damages (arising out of
allegedly unpaid wages and benefits) should be offset by funds to which Beckman helped
herself. The amount of the offset could not readily be determined by mathematical
calculation and had to be "assessed by the trier of fact at trial." See Cornia, 898 P.2d at
1387.
Third, the jury had to determine whether Beckman waived or otherwise deferred
her right to the salary and benefits she sought. That determination, of course, would have
affected her ability to recover damages in any amount.
Although Beckman cites a few cases in support of her claim to prejudgment
interest, each case is inapposite or distinguishable. In none of the cases Beckman cites
does the court address a situation where the factfinder must apply its judgment not only
to assess whether the harm occurred at all (but was waived), but to what extent the harm
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occurred (whether it should be offset) and how long the harm continued (whether it was
capped or forfeited by termination for cause). There is simply no argument that
Beckman's damages were "fixed" prior to the jury's independent determination of all
these factual issues. See Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201, ,I 65 (discussing James

Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P .2d 665, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994, which
held that prejudgment interest on attorney's fees "would be inappropriate ... because
they are not fixed or calculable with mathematical certainty until the court makes an
independent determination of their reasonableness"). Further, Beckman does not cite a
single case wherein a court awarded prejudgment interest based on a contract on all fours
with the Employment Agreement.

Kraatz, is distinguishable from this case. There, the Utah Supreme Court had
determined that termination was for cause. See 2003 UT App 201, ,I,I 1-2. There was
not discussion of any evidence that the employer might be entitled to an offset. By
contrast, here, Cybertary' s defenses to Beckman' s wage claim, as well as the nature of
the claim itself, meant that the amount of damages was not fixed or measurable by "facts
and figures." See id.

1 67.

Although Beckman correctly states that whether to award

prejudgment interest is generally a question of law, the Court should not merely "rely on
the nature of the claim" to determine whether prejudgment interest is appropriate. See

Shoreline Dev., Inc. v. Utah Cty, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The jury's
role in assessing the amount of damages makes an award of prejudgment interest
improper.
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B.

Beckman Did Not Provide Sufficient Evidence of the Correct Amount
of Prejudgment Interest.

Beckman's claimed prejudgment interest is not "calculable with mathematical
certainty" (at least on the evidence Beckman provided) for yet another reason: Beckman
cannot argue that she is entitled to prejudgment interest on the full amount of the jury's
award where the interest would have to accrue for each payment from the date it was
missed. See Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ~ 8, 82 P.3d 1064 (noting that
prejudgment interest is calculated from the date of the breach). Based on the
Employment Agreement, Beckman was to be paid a specified amount on the 15th and the
31st of each month. (R. 600.) Beckman's demonstrative Exhibit 34 enumerates the dates
upon which Cybertary paid Beckman, and, by implication, upon which it did not. That
exhibit enumerates several instances where Beckman was not timely paid her salary.
Based on the jury verdict, each instance would constitute a separate breach of the
Employment Agreement. Prejudgment interest would start ticking from those dates. But
based on demonstrative Exhibit 32, in several instances-specifically, on July 24, 2011;
from April 27-29, 2011; and on February 15, 2011-Cybertary overpaid Beckman. This
raises several potential issues regarding Beckman' s calculation of prejudgment interest.
It is unclear whether the surplus payments ( 1) should be credited against the prejudgment
interest already accrued; (2) should be applied to the total amount of prejudgment interest
accrued; or (3) should be applied to the prejudgment interest arising from the oldest
outstanding payment. The uncertainty is heightened by the fact that the Employment
Agreement is silent as to what should be done with any excess payments.
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In light of the foregoing, calculating prejudgment interest arising from a breach of
the Employment Agreements is far more difficult than Beckman suggests. These
complicated calculations-which may require the application of accounting principlesfall within the purview of expert testimony, not mere arithmetic. See Utah R. Evid.
702( a)-(b ); see also Smith, 2003 UT 41,

~

26 (discussing prejudgment interest calculated

by expert). Beckman did not offer any expert to make a prejudgment interest calculation
from the date of each breach of the Employment Agreement that includes the
apportionment of late payments.

VII.

THE COURT SHOULD AW ARD CYBERTARY ITS ATTORNEY FEES
AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL.
A "district court may properly consider a request to award ... attorney fees and

costs associated with" a successful appeal arising out of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.

See Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ~ 21. The Court should therefore award Franchise Foundry
and Faulconer their attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. Furthermore, Section 16
of the Employment Agreement requires the "nonprevailing party" to pay the prevailing
party's attorney fees and costs. (R. 77.) The Court should therefore also award
Cybertary its attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against Beckman's appeal.
Upon the Court's direction, Appellees reserve the right to submit declarations of attorney
fees and costs to this Court or, if so directed, to the district court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court in all respects.
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